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Energy systems have rarely been on the lips of political ecologists. The silence is striking in leading 
texts (e.g. Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Bryant and Bailey, 1997; Robbins, 2012). Yet access to 
centralized energy infrastructures (or the lack thereof) strongly reflects who can take part in 
‘development’ and ‘progress’. Today many centralized energy systems appear in the contradictory 
position of too much carbon causing climate change and too little carbon causing ‘peak oil’ (Bridge, 
2010). But the infrastructures rarely take centre stage: instead discussions are about fuels and emissions, 
the energy mix and carbon offsets (Bumpus and Liverman, 2008). Still, Bridge (2010; also Mitchell, 
2011; Zimmerer, 2011) addresses the social and technological networks through which energy 
resources are produced; and Bennett (2010) reconceptualizes the electricity grid as a socio-physical 
event with great potential to better understand links between politics, infrastructure and hydrocarbons. 
Here, I build on such promising work by addressing the historical nature of electricity infrastructure as 
part of a wider effort to encourage a historically-informed political ecology of energy systems. 
 This task is all the more important given widespread but misguided thinking on the possibility of 
simply substituting ‘clean’ for ‘dirty’ energy. To survive peak oil and changing climate crises, it is often 
assumed that the energy potential of fossil fuels must be substituted for an equal amount of renewable 
energy (York, 2012). Hence, a huge amount of biomass, wind farms or solar panels are needed to replace 
an oil barrel kilowatt for kilowatt. Such a low-carbon transformation would have severe consequences 
in that it would devour large land areas, prompting a dramatic expansion in the size of ‘violent 
environments’ linked to energy production (Peluso and Watts, 2001). 
But in this chapter I wish to emphasize a different point, namely that the very assumption about 
‘easy’ technological substitution underpinning such thinking is wrong. Electricity systems – 
configurations of metal wires, hydrocarbons, turbines and electron movements – are fundamentally 
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historical products reflecting quite specific political and economic interests. Today’s electricity grids 
demand high energy input to satiate those interests. Yet the energy demand of an energy system is not 
inherently about the technology; infrastructure is not just ‘out there’ requiring a new energy source. 
Rather, political and economic interests are manifest in the technology. This point has momentous 
political, economic and ecological implications: historically-specific and usually unjust interests that 
energy systems embody can and must be challenged through scholarly and activist means rather than 
devoting effort to blindly go down the path of a false technological substitution; substitution that not 
only avoids challenging powerful political and economic interests but actually facilitates further large-
scale land grabbing on their behalf – this time in the name of alternative energy. 
My aim in this chapter is to develop a historically-based kind of understanding that ought to guide 
political ecologists as they engage more systematically than hitherto in critical analysis of energy 
systems. To do so, I focus on electricity infrastructure beginning with a brief introduction to key 
concepts from thermodynamics and systems ecology. While energy systems are profoundly political, 
these social relations are also contingent on how energy physically behaves in relation to a given 
infrastructure. I then draw on work on the history of electrification in the United States, the Soviet 
Union and the former Third World to show how energy systems are socially produced across time, 
space and political ideology. I conclude by suggesting avenues for future research into the political 
ecology of energy systems. 
 
Politicizing thermodynamics 
Let me first reacquaint the reader with the washing machine. As Hans Rosling (2010) recounts, this is 
a spectacular machine which frees up much time, often for women, when manual scrubbing and 
pounding is replaced by its centrifugal powers. To operate, the washing machine needs mechanical 
energy. This could be supplied from the motion of wind through a turbine to the drum with one single 
energy conversion. Yet this kind of mechanical low-tech system is often regarded as ‘traditional’. Most 
‘modern’ washing machines run on electricity generated from fossil fuels. 
Fossil fuels originate in the sun. Through photosynthesis, sunshine is converted into green plants 
and algae. Algae go through their life cycles before they decompose and end up on the sea floor. Over 
hundreds of millions of years other biomass covers the algae; pressure builds up, the temperature rises 
and they slowly become petroleum. Year-millions of solar energy are thereby stored in the molecular 
bonds of hydrocarbons. Fossil fuels can thus be conceptualized as a historical accumulation of land (or 
sea) area on which the sun once shone. If such fuels were substituted for contemporary land area it 
would immediately become a political question of how land is managed and distributed – with ensuing 
conflict pitting humans against each other as well as against the nonhuman world (Dukes, 2003; 
Hermele, 2012; Howard et al., 2009). 
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The petroleum is next pumped from the subsoil by a multinational oil company and then 
transported to a thermoelectric power plant (Ferguson, 2005; Watts, 2004). There it is set on fire. This 
releases energy stored in the hydrocarbon bonds and converts it into heat. The heat is used to evaporate 
water which is set in motion. The moving steam is led into a turbine where it is transformed into 
mechanical energy. This energy is used to spin a magnet in a generator which transforms the mechanical 
energy into electricity. The current is then prepared for transmission. The voltage is stepped up to reduce 
the amount of electricity dissipating as heat. When the current has travelled to a location where there is 
a concentrated consumer demand, the voltage is stepped down to a level that can be used by a washing 
machine. It is distributed to its consumer, comes out of a socket and enters the washing machine where 
the energy is transformed anew into mechanical energy to spin the drum. 
Across the millions of years that have passed since the energy was first generated by the sun, none 
has been destroyed. It has only been transformed. This is known as the First law of thermodynamics 
(Smil, 2008). In each transformation, however, energy has not only been converted into the form 
required to finally spin the washing machine drum. It has also transformed into heat. This heat is rarely 
of use as it dissipates into the atmosphere. Therefore, as soon as energy is set to work, the quantity of 
useful energy diminishes: its ‘entropy’ increases. This phenomenon defines the Second law of 
thermodynamics. The efficiency with which energy is transformed from one form to another is (with a 
bit of simplification) the ‘conversion efficiency’ (Lovins, 2004). The aggregate conversion efficiency 
of using wind to spin a washing machine drum is much higher than the efficiency of using electricity. 
The Second law states that entropy increases spontaneously in all energy processes. This means 
that energy always is a one-way flow; that energy use never can be reversed. Consequently, new high-
quality energy must enter the system continuously to sustain a process like a spinning washing machine 
drum. The amount of energy available to do work in a system is called ‘exergy’. The low efficiency of 
electricity production in a thermoelectric power plant means that much more exergy must be imported 
to sustain the washing machine than is necessary in a system powered by the wind. On Earth, a wind-
powered washing machine drum can be spun as long as the wind, blowing due to the sun’s uneven 
heating of the atmosphere, provides exergy. Fossil fuels, in contrast, form over the extreme longue 
durée. In a process dependent on fossilized exergy sources, exergy is therefore consumed at a much 
faster pace than new energy potential can enter the system. 
In the 1970s thermodynamics (or ‘energetics’) became a concern for social scientists. Most 
notably, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen (1971) argued that all economic processes increase entropy. The 
economy is therefore in constant need of exergy and raw material input which, Georgescu-Roegen 
argued, inevitably puts limits to growth. Daly (1974) elaborated this idea by outlining a steady-state 
economy which would be environmentally and economically sustainable. These perspectives today 
thrive in the field of ecological economics and in the ‘de-growth’ movement (Healy et al., this volume). 
Occasionally, political ecologists have engaged with the issue of thermodynamics. In the 1980s, 
Stephen Bunker (1985) infused Georgescu-Roegen’s thesis with neo-Marxist dependency theory by 
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arguing that production in the world industrial core was enabled by a transfer of energy and matter from 
peripheral extractive economies. He also drew on work on energy in ecological anthropology (White, 
1959; Adams, 1975) to argue that the core’s ability to harness great amounts of energy enabled it to 
develop more complex social organization. Meanwhile, the social organization of the periphery, drained 
of energy and matter, became simplified and underdeveloped. Later, Alf Hornborg (2001) strengthened 
Bunker’s analysis by freeing it of its functionalism through incorporation into the world-systems 
perspective. Hence, industrial technology is not an index of cultural ‘progress’, but rather an index of 
accumulation whereby a population’s technological capacity (i.e. amount of energy harnessed) above 
all defines its position in the world system. 
Many historians of technology in contrast are sceptical about this sort of grand explanation. Nye 
(1998), for example, frames his analysis in terms of specific energy systems and associated cultures. In 
the following, I draw on such historical literature linking it to concepts of energy, entropy and exergy. 
By doing this, I affirm the value of historically-grounded political ecologies. This has long been a 
mainstay in work on natural resource struggles (Guha, 1989; Peluso, 1992) but has not yet been 
sufficiently explored in relation to science and technology themes which are gaining currency in the 
field today. Moreover, my analysis will enable me to argue that the question of how society can 
substitute renewable energy sources for existing fossil fuels on a one-to-one basis is a treacherous one 
which conceals the political-ecology dynamics of energy systems in a way ultimately injurious to many 
people and environments. 
 
Extending the grid: the US experience 
The United States is the world’s largest energy consumer per capita. It is also where the world’s first 
electricity system was developed, in the Wall Street district of New York City, by Thomas Edison and 
his team of engineers. Thomas Hughes is a leading chronicler of Edison and his electricity grid. Hughes 
argues that an electricity system in general is a network of interrelated parts which usually are under 
central control. The extent of this control delimits the extent of the system (Hughes 1983). When 
Hughes (1983: 41-2) analyses Edison’s creation, the emphasis on centrality is clear: ‘Edison’s ultimate 
objective was to introduce central-station supply … A central station would distribute electric light to 
the public, in contrast to generating plants, or isolated stations, which would be used only by their 
owners.’ This design would enable customers to receive ‘an unusually effective light without hazardous 
and noxious fumes. In the Wall Street district the station would also catch the attention of financiers 
and the investing public, persons who were needed to fund Edison stations elsewhere’ (Hughes, 1983: 
41-2). Thus, the centralized technological design was clearly a product of Edison’s own making. Central 
control even turns out to be not only a design but an argument for a cleaner city and a business strategy. 
However Hughes, somewhat against the grain of his overall argument, turns this historical product into 
a general definition of the electrical grid. The definition he uses to analyse electrification thus derives 
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from the very materiality he seeks to explain. Hence, so strong is the idea that electricity systems 
extending over space like a spider spinning its web are controlled by and from the centre. That other 
definitions are possible here is evident, for instance, from Bennett’s (2010) Deleuzian engagement with 
the electricity grid as an assemblage of the human and non-human. 
Edison’s system was based on a central station to which coal was transported and from which a 
direct current (DC) was distributed throughout the district. Edison’s design can be seen as an alliance 
forged between the social and economic aspirations he wanted to serve and the behaviour of electricity 
in the wires that extended around Wall Street. Soon, however, Edison exported his central station system 
and the wish to transport electricity over longer distances arose. For instance, this was a precondition 
to incorporate hydropower into the system. As a source with huge energy potential (high exergy content) 
there were great economic interests involved. The demand for long-distance transmission changed the 
circumstances in relation to which the Wall Street system had been designed. It strained Edison’s 
alliance with the current. 
The problem was that as soon as an electric current passes through a metal wire it causes it to heat 
up. It is the resistance of the wire that bothers the current. Engineers know this phenomenon as Joule’s 
first law. According to Joule, the heat generated (Q) is proportional to the resistance of the wire (R) 
multiplied by the square of the current (I). Or for short, Q ∝ I2R. What this equation captures had 
dramatic consequences for the politicians and engineers who wanted to extend the grid geographically 
to boost the economy. As the power line gets longer its resistance to the current increases. This means 
that more electric energy is transformed into heat, dissipating into the atmosphere, when it has to travel 
over longer distances. But this also stands in proportion to the current that runs through the line. A low 
current generates less heat while a high current generates more. In Edison’s Wall Street system this was 
not a problem since the direct current only had to travel a short way to reach its consumers. 
With a last twist of electromagnetic theory, the trick to make long-distance transmission feasible 
is that a low current requires a high voltage. In fact, to minimize the increase of entropy during transport, 
the voltage must be so high that it hardly can be used in domestic or industrial appliances. In today’s 
transmission networks transmission generally takes place at between 115 000 and 800 000 volts whereas 
the electricity that comes out of the socket usually rates 110 or 230 volts. In Edison’s day, there were 
no transformers available that could reduce a high DC transmission voltage to a low voltage for use. 
Thus, the cost of transmitting DC over long distances prohibited the extension of the grid that seemed 
so economically lucrative. 
To fulfil their economic and social dreams, politicians and engineers had to seek new alliances 
with the current. What resulted became known as the ‘Battle of the Currents’ (Hughes, 1983: ch. 5). 
With alternating current (AC), as opposed to DC, it is an easy task to transform voltages. But Edison 
ferociously favoured DC. One reason was that he only had patents for a DC design. The argument he 
voiced, however, was the danger of AC which by accident or on purpose could be used for electrocution. 
In his campaign for a DC standard, Edison publicly electrocuted cats and dogs to prove the danger of 
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AC, culminating in him electrocuting a circus elephant named Topsy with 6600 volts in 1903. AC, on 
the other hand, was favoured among others by George Westinghouse as it cheaply enabled long-distance 
transmission. AC ultimately won the battle, which is evident from the national and intercontinental 
grids that span the world today. Electricity is also ‘lost’ as heat in these power lines and the World Bank 
(2014) estimates that 6 per cent of the total energy output was ‘lost’ in US grids in 2011. The estimate 
was 11 per cent for Egypt, 16 per cent for Cuba, 21 per cent for India, with Haiti topping the list at 55 
per cent. It should be noted that these numbers, which in a deceptively exact way indicate a difficult 
thing to measure, also include pilferage – itself an interesting act of resistance to the political ecology 
of electricity systems. 
These losses can be endured by supplying the grid with energy sources that have enormous energy 
potential: hundreds of millions of years of sunshine fossilized in hydrocarbon bonds; water gushing 
through monumental dam gates; and the subatomic energy of enriched uranium. Yet these exergy 
sources all have adverse effects on the socio-environmental systems they interact with. Coal, gas, oil 
and peat partly transform into carbon dioxide as they are burned, while dam reservoirs are one of the 
world’s greatest emitters of methane (Bates et al., 2008) – both highly active greenhouse gases. Nuclear 
fission meanwhile produces radioactive waste and thermal pollution. 
In the 1930s, where Hughes’s book ends, the energy intensity of the United States’ economy 
increased sharply (Nye, 1998). In particular, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) became 
emblematic of American ‘progress’. The TVA is among other installations a series of almost thirty 
hydroelectric dams; a project described as ‘Democracy on the March’ by David Lilienthal, the TVA’s 
first leader. TVA was part of Roosevelt’s New Deal and was seen as a technological intervention that 
at once would make the Tennessee River navigable, electrify the ‘backward’ southern states, improve 
flood control and industrialize agriculture in the Tennessee Valley (Klingensmith, 2007). Lilienthal 
explained how construction of the dams—large nodes of electricity production supplying a central 
transmission line—had followed a rational, technocratic plan of progressive engineering. Daniel 
Klingensmith (2007; also Ekbladh, 2002) shows how this narrative rapidly gained currency. But while 
the dams became entwined with a narrative of modernizing America, the TVA was decidedly not the 
result of a pre-existing technician’s plan. Klingensmith (2007) argues instead that it was the product of 
an intervention in the debate on public vs. private ownership; of a vision of dominating nature for social 
benefit; of a solution of what to do with a First World War fertiliser plant and hydroelectric dam in 
Alabama; of a drive to make a river usable for transport; and more. The TVA also led to forced 
resettlement to make way for the reservoirs as well as subsequent displacement of ‘uncompetitive’ small 
farmers in an era of industrializing agriculture (the latter being a process enabled by the building of 
dams). So strong was the belief, however, that the engineering and design of the energy system were 
apolitical, scientifically objective practices that ‘political considerations’ could not ‘influence the 
selection of particular dam sites or technologies’ (Klingensmith, 2007: 60). And so it became an 
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apolitical issue that 125 480 people, by an official count, were forcefully resettled to make space for the 
reservoirs. 
With the TVA, electrification became a symbol of national progress in the US. At the same time, 
electrification took an equally central position in the nascent Soviet Union. 
 
Powering up the Soviet Union 
Russia’s electrification had been a low priority for the tsar. The future of the empire was believed to be 
linked to the railway. But after the First World War and subsequent Russian Civil War (1918-1921) the 
railroads lay in ruin. When the Bolsheviks seized power priorities changed and electrification 
superseded railway-building as the dominant government concern. ‘The century of steam was the 
century of the bourgeoisie’, Lenin proclaimed (1920 cited in Cummins, 1988: 105), ‘and the century of 
electricity is the century of socialism’. 
Just as in America, the technological structure of the Soviet grid was not the result of the inexorable 
advance of the national productive forces. In 1920 a grand plan was compiled by the State Commission 
for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO) at the behest of Lenin. While the plan framed electrification 
as a technological imperative, it nonetheless strongly reflected political and economic calculations. It 
specified construction of a large network of 27 regional thermoelectric power plants. Yet, as 
Coopersmith (1992: 153) argues, ‘[t]he challenges to GOELRO may have been phrased technically, but 
they concerned the very nature and direction of the Soviet state. Would it be directed from the center or 
guided from below? The choice of electrification embodied in GOELRO strengthened the first 
direction.’ 
Electricity loomed large in Lenin’s rhetoric epitomized in his motto that ‘Communism is Soviet 
power plus electrification of the whole country’. Electricity would both figuratively and literally bring 
the masses into the light, while bridging the gap between city and country as the ‘backward’ peasantry 
was modernized. ‘Of course’, Lenin (1966: 517) declared in presenting the plan to the Eighth All-
Russian Congress of Soviets in 1920, 
 
to the non-Party peasant masses electric light is an ‘unnatural’ light; but what we consider unnatural is that 
the peasants and workers should have lived for hundreds and thousands of years in such backwardness, 
poverty and oppression under the yoke of the landowners and capitalists. ... What we must now try is to 
convert every electric power station we build into a stronghold of enlightenment to be used to make the 
masses electricity-conscious, so to speak. 
 
Lenin (1966: 516) argued that only by introducing ‘a new technical base’ could ‘the internal enemy’ 
(i.e. a potential capitalist class taking grip in the countryside) be undermined and the socialist state 
prevail. Somehow, a long-distance transmission network featuring 27 central nodes of fossil-fuel-based 
electricity generation responded to this belief. Cummins (1988: 28) remarks with reference to the 1934 
Moscow edition of the Tekhnicheskaia Entsiklopediia (Technical Encyclopaedia) that ‘In the Soviet 
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technical lexicon, electrification is the transfer of a nation’s economy to a technical base of 
contemporary large-scale machine-building industry through the concentration of generating 
capabilities primarily in large regional power stations.’ And so, Lenin’s vision had seemingly become 
‘objective’ knowledge by the 1930s. In light of Stalin’s brutal collectivization buttressed by this new 
technical base, however, it is debatable how far the GOELRO grid actually lit the peasant’s hitherto 
‘dark’ world. Rather, the capacity to dramatically (re) organize energy flows was above all a strong 
source of political-ecological power – power to organize certain kinds of environments for human 
interaction. 
Yet the GOELRO plan for a centralized grid had been hotly contested. Lenin’s support for it met 
stiff opposition, notably among political leaders such as Alexei Rykov and Leon Trotsky (Cummins, 
1988). The plan was also opposed by urban and municipal utilities who favoured a decentralized grid 
(Coopersmith, 1992). At the time, only Petrograd (Saint Petersburg) and Moscow had a limited 
electricity supply underpinned by the tsar’s railways which transported peat and coal to their central 
stations. Opposition to Lenin’s plan amounted to a struggle over the physical layout of the grid – that 
is, whether electrification should be controlled by central or local government. This political conflict 
stalled implementation of the GOELRO plan in the early 1920s compromising in turn the New 
Economic Policy announced in 1921. And yet, such political turmoil masked an underlying process that 
eventually came to define the Soviet state and, later on, other Communist states around the world: a 
combination of central planning and heavy technological construction that became almost synonymous 
with state socialist practice and Marxist-Leninist theory (Cummins, 1988). 
After Lenin’s death in 1924 and Stalin’s subsequent seizure of political power, GOELRO became 
part of the State General Planning Commission (Gosplan) which would lead the Soviet Union’s five-
year planning until its dissolution in 1991. When the first five-year plan was completed in 1932, 
GOELRO’s goals had been fulfilled as they were part-and-parcel of Stalin’s accelerated 
industrialization campaign (Coopersmith, 1992). During this plan the budget for electrification was 
quadrupled but with generation capacity concentrated in a few key industrialized areas only: ‘This 
realization of the GOELRO plan reinforced the centralized nature of industrial development and 
control’ (Coopersmith, 1992: 258). Hence, the physical form of the energy system closely meshed with 
the interests of the Stalin-directed central government and GOELRO engineers. The physical and 
human geography of this energy system – where it reached, who could (or could not) access it, the 
purposes it served and the interests it embodied – was thus deeply embedded in a new set of 
(revolutionary) social relations. These relations were in turn maintained by the exergy content of the 
peat, coal and oil that fuelled the system. 
However, after the Second World War something peculiar happens. The turbulent histories of US 
and Soviet electrification are forgotten. Electrification becomes an abstraction, an ‘objective’ 




The current moves South 
In 1944, William Voorduin travelled to wartime India. A former TVA engineer, he was dispatched there 
by the TVA leader David Lilienthal to advice the British-Indian government on the building of a series 
of dams on the Damodar River west of Kolkata. The presence of TVA engineers in India, though, would 
continue long past independence from Britain in 1947: 
 
From the 1940s to the 1960s there were plans for new ‘TVAs’ in India, China, Palestine, 
Peru, Iran, Colombia and several other countries. Or more precisely, there were plans for 
river development in these lands that to varying degrees invoked TVA as their inspiration 
and called for TVA personnel to help implement them (Klingensmith, 2007: 68; see also 
Ekbladh, 2002).    
 
This was the image of TVA that had solidified in the United States, becoming a symbol of American 
‘progress’, that subsequently travelled the world. Engineers like Voorduin ‘looked at the Damodar and 
saw in it the Tennessee as it had been before 1933, and looked at Bihar and Bengal and saw in them the 
American South’ (Klingensmith, 2007: 73). In 1948, the DVC (Damodar Valley Corporation), a thermal 
and hydropower generating authority, was created on the TVA model to manage the Damodar. 
For political leaders in what was becoming the ‘Third World’ (Escobar, 1995), electrification was 
a core priority. ‘Modern’ electric energy was replacing ‘traditional’ energy forms such as motion to 
propel pumps and spin drums. As in the United States, a strong narrative was developed around the idea 
that electrification was a purely technical and therefore apolitical matter. Once again, electrification 
was a necessity in the pursuit of progress – a view that crossed ideological lines. Hence, it was pursued 
with alacrity by both pro-Western countries (e.g. Thailand, the Philippines) and pro-Communist nations 
(e.g. China, Cuba). Indeed, much of what international financial institutions have done in the post-1945 
era has been linked directly or indirectly to electrification. In fact, the World Bank was still lending 
money for electrification projects and the formation of national utilities into the 1990s (Collier, 1984; 
Goldman, 2005). During that decade though, the policy was changed as the World Bank promoted a 
neo-liberalization agenda. Thus, power grids were ‘unbundled’ into generation, transmission, 
distribution and retail segments so as to allow competition to flourish throughout (Xu, 2006). The World 
Bank’s interest in large-scale development projects like electrification and dam-building was not 
coincidental but is at the heart of this organization: ‘TVA, as Lilienthal represented it, was a key point 
in the articulation of the world view on which the World Bank was based’ (Klingensmith, 2007: 62). 
For Third World leaders, meanwhile, no primary energy source shared the symbolic power of 
hydropower. ‘The TVA idea’ joined hands with notions of development, nation, independence, 
modernization, industry and progress – ‘so important were dams in the mid-1950s, Jawaharlal Nehru 
spoke of them as the “temples” of a new, progressive India’ (Klingensmith, 2007: 5). To not have access 
to electricity was also integral to modernization narratives whereby ‘poor’ people were defined as such 
for ‘lacking’ electricity and development (Chakrabarty, 2000). 
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Even grander plans were afoot in Communist China where Chairman Mao in one of his poems 
from 1956 envisioned the damming of the Yangtze River. By 2008 the vision of the Three Gorges Dam 
stood completed: 181 metres high and with 32 turbines to generate hydroelectric energy (Schapiro, 
2001; Smil, 2004). Yet the ever more expensive pursuit of high exergy sources to fuel ever more 
extensive electricity networks, underpinning development, has had severe social and environmental 
impacts throughout the Third World or South (Goldman, 2005). By redistributing physical power across 
space, dams unevenly distribute the costs and benefits of ‘progress’ in modernizing states across people 
and ecosystems.  With Jamal Abd al-Nasser’s Aswan dam in Egypt in mind, Mitchell (2002: 21) argues 
that ‘[f]or many postcolonial governments, this ability to rearrange the natural and social environment 
became a means to demonstrate the strength of the modern state as a techno-economic power.’ Hence, 
resonating with the experiences of the United States and the Soviet Union, the technological 
infrastructures and transformed environments these policies leave behind cannot be separated from the 
political-economic interests and imaginaries that their foundations were cast within. And those 
embedded interests and imaginaries now have global ecological implications: for instance, the dams 
that supply the vast amounts of exergy fuelling Indian development contribute a whopping 18.5 per 
cent of India’s total greenhouse gas emissions from the methane that their reservoirs release 
(Dharmadhikary, 2008: 29). 
But electrical dreams were not only the preserve of countries aided by the United States. The 
Soviet idea of a socialist technical base also travelled the world, reaching China, as noted, by the 1950s 
and Cuba by the 1960s. Thus, as Cuban economist Santiago Rodríguez Castellón (1988: 150, my 
translation) argued, ‘[a] country like Cuba, in full progress of development, that works to build the 
socialist techno-material base and that pays constant attention to the objective of trying to meet the most 
elementary necessities and aspirations of our [sic] people, necessarily must increase its energy 
consumption.’ Indeed, revolutionary success was interpreted in terms of per capita electricity 
consumption – up from 377 kilowatt-hours per person pre-Revolution (i.e. 1958) to 1106 kilowatt-hours 
per person in 1988 (Rodríguez Castellón, 1988: 154). This discourse is strikingly similar to Lenin’s. 
But the similarities went further.  
The Cuban National Electricity System (the SEN) was completed in 1976. It seems in many ways 
like a carbon copy of the GOELRO plan. The grid stretches across the island from Pinar del Río in the 
west via Havana to Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo in the east. In the late 1970s, nine thermoelectric 
power plants were dispersed along this high-voltage AC line, most of them named after heroes of the 
Cuban anti-colonial struggle. By 1989, 95 per cent of the Cuban population had access to centralized 
electricity supply in comparison to 56 per cent before the Revolution (Bérriz and Madruga, 2000: 4). 
Here, a point made by Cummins (1988: 8-9; cf. Lenin, 1966: 518) about Soviet electrification rings 
(partly) true: ‘[it] created the myth that a backward country with plentiful energy resources can become 
a modern, industrial state within a short period of time by developing its economy on the basis of one 
technology, namely electrification.’ 
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And yet, Cuba unlike the Soviet Union lacked ‘plentiful energy resources’. The nine power plants 
all relied on crude oil imported from the Soviet Union. The Cuban socialist project therefore developed 
its new technical base and economic growth on West Siberian and Caspian exergy reserves. That such 
an import-reliant energy system represented a good thing for Cubans was always debatable. After the 
Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991, however, the debate was over as Cuban oil imports rapidly plummeted 
by 87 per cent and with them national electricity output (ONE, 2012). What remained of the once-
mighty SEN was a local joke as one ethnographic account records: 
 
Here we do not have apagones [cuts in electricity], we have lumbrones (a longer period of light)  ... 
There was no water for hours on end in buildings that depended on electric pumps. After dark, no 
house work could be done, no books or papers read, no television watched and no meetings held. 
People often just stood or sat around in their yards smoking and chatting with their neighbors 
(Rosendahl, 1997: 169). 
 
In this country of the South, electrification was no longer a heady abstraction – a prediction of 
development long foretold by political and economic elites. The material loss of current has had 
decidedly tangible consequences for large parts of society. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the political ecology of energy systems via the example of electrification. It 
shows how such systems are inevitably historical products that are deeply shaped by political and 
economic interests and rationales. As the case studies from the United States, the Soviet Union and the 
former Third World also illustrate, dreams of electricity has fundamentally shaped notions of 
‘development’ and ‘progress’ across time, space and even political ideology – albeit, in location-
specific ways. However articulated and justified, these energy systems do not necessarily represent 
‘better’ or more ‘progressive’ technologies than ‘old’ less ‘modern’ ones. Rather, they represent specific 
political and economic interests and rationales that are fulfilled or not and contested or not.  
At the same time, as seen with electricity networks, the existence of energy systems is equally 
dependent on specific alliances forged with exergy reserves, metal wires and thermodynamic properties. 
To recall the starting point: a particular energy system demands a particular quantity of energy input. If 
the task is to spin a washing machine drum, it could be spun with mechanical energy generated through 
one single conversion from the motion of the wind. But to do the same thing with electricity supplied 
through a long-distance AC transmission grid, a significantly longer sequence of energy transformations 
occurs and hence a much larger supply of exergy is required. The combination of peak oil and climate 
change are condemning this current system based on fossil-fuel exergy. But simply making a wholesale 
switch to renewable energy sources as some argue is a recipe for disaster as land grabbing for the latter 
will only mean the proliferation of ‘violent environments’ (Peluso and Watts, 2001). Indeed, calls for 
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such a switch reflect a basic lack of understanding of the political and ecological dynamics that are 
associated with every type of energy system. 
To ever make genuine progress in tackling global energy and carbon crises that bedevil humans 
and non-humans today, it is absolutely imperative to begin by understanding those political and 
ecological dynamics. Here, a challenging and multifaceted research agenda awaits political ecologists. 
Clearly, and building on some of the research selectively noted in the introduction, the political and 
economic interests and rationales that are tenaciously bound up with fossil-fuel dependent infrastructure 
must be critically examined. These include connections between infrastructure and processes of nation-
state formation (Swyngedouw, 2007), encompassing the sorts of historically-based formative events 
and processes emphasized in this chapter. This work requires systematic elboration, particularly in the 
South, where the challenges are today most acute and relatively little attention as yet has been given to 
the political ecology of energy systems. 
Another research area concerns the question of how energy systems resonate with notions of 
everyday modern life in relation to political dynamics influenced by gender, ethnic and other social 
factors (Arnold, 2013). How poor women and ethnic minorities, for example, may be involved in 
conflicts over access to electricity and other energy systems taps into a long-standing political ecology 
theme (albeit, usually discussed in relation to agrarian and other natural resources) but requires more 
attention than it has been given to date. And yet, scholars need to be somewhat sceptical about concepts 
such as energy poverty (Buzar, 2007; Harrison and Popke, 2011) and energy justice (Bickerstaff et al., 
2013) that sometimes reflect a wider development discourse in which some people are seen as ‘lacking’ 
development – hence requiring ‘expert’ intervention. Instead, research needs to examine one key but 
often overlooked question: why are certain forms of energy use that often demand little exergy input 
often seen as ‘lacking’ in terms of development in contrast to more energy-intensive uses for the same 
purpose that are propelling humanity into global crises? The point here of course is not to romanticize 
all ‘traditional’ knowledge but rather to assess how far such knowledge can be a basis for alternatives 
to current development pathways. This quest can also draw on thinking in ecological economics on new 
models of energy use embedded in de-growth or steady-state societies that reject notions of modernity 
and the nation-state manifest in currently hegemonic energy systems. 
 Detailed ethnographic work on how low-carbon energy use is socially negotiated in different 
contexts in the contemporary period is vital here (Strauss et al., 2013). This would also play to existing 
political-ecology methodological strengths. Such studies would help to ‘de-familiarize’ Western norms 
of high-exergy energy use by juxtaposing it with existing alternatives (Boyer, 2011; Bridge et al., 2013). 
In parallel, more research is needed on how socially and ecologically marginalized people negotiate 
and resist dominant energy systems, for example by pilfering on power lines, tapping into pipelines or 
inventing their own local-level schemes (Mitchell, 2011). These processes may include counter-
narratives that re-frame how specific energy systems are seen as positive or negative. 
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These sorts of research issues and questions bespeak an important topic area that has yet to receive 
the systematic attention it requires.  The role of history is often central here too as unequal power 
relations shape the introduction of energy systems with far-reaching and long-lasting consequences, as 
this chapter has shown. For political ecology to persist as a vibrant research field in the face of current 
crises such as climate change and peak oil, such historically-informed analysis of energy systems is 
nothing less than essential. 
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